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Bringing Women on Board? 'Women-Friendly' Welfare States and Gender Diversity in Top Jobs

Towards Resilient Nordic Welfare States

University of Helsinki

14-15 March 2019




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
Women's share of board seats



2003 data for POL, USA and AUS unavailable

Sources: EIGE; MSCI


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Policy approaches to women on boards as of 2017



**'Hard'
quotas
(5)**

Belgium (33% by 2017)
France (40% by 2017)
Germany (30% by 2016)
Italy (33% by 2015)
Norway (40% by 2008)



**'Soft'
regulation
(8)**


Australia
Austria
Denmark
Finland
Netherlands
Spain
Sweden
UK



**No
regulation
(11)**

Czech Republic
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Luxembourg
Poland
Portugal
Slovakia
Slovenia
Switzerland
US

This study




AIM

To identify the conditions under which gender-diverse boards are achieved.



METHOD

Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 24 OECD countries using fsQCA software 3.0 (+ sensitivity analyses).




DATA SOURCES

Eurostat, OECD's Family Database, Government at a Glance Database, and Employment and Labour Market Statistics, Deloitte, EIGE, national sources

WTF (What The Fuzzy-set)?

An illustration:

Conditions



Outcome, Y


■ Y is present

■ Y is absent

Therefore:

$X+B \text{ OR } A \Rightarrow Y$

Condition #1




The welfare state 'paradox' (Mandel and Semyonov, 2006)

'Women-friendly' welfare states strengthen the 'glass ceiling' that makes it harder for women to progress in their careers

'Women-friendly' index.

Measure	Maximum women-friendliness (Index score = 100)	Minimum women-friendliness (Index score = 0)
<i>Leave policies</i>		
Paid maternity leave	30 weeks	0 weeks
Average replacement rate	100%	20%
<i>Education and care services</i>		
Full-time equivalent enrolment rates of under-threes in formal care arrangements	33%	15%
Full-time equivalent enrolment rates of 3-5-year-olds in formal care arrangements	90%	70%
<i>Flexible working options</i>		
Percentage of female employees with some ability to set their own working time arrangements	100%	0%
<i>Welfare state as employer</i>		
Percentage of total workforce employed in general government	30%	10%


Condition #2




Strong EPL also strengthens the glass ceiling (Estévez-Abe, 2005, 2006)

By making it harder to hire/fire employees, strict EPL can increase statistical discrimination against women and make it harder for women to change jobs.


Condition #3



Condition #4




Outcome




Women must comprise a 'critical mass' of $\geq 30\%$ of board members to exert power and influence (e.g. Konrad et al., 2008; Krook, 2009; Torchia et al., 2011)

Results



Results



Two (combinations of) conditions lead to the outcome:

1. Hard quota OR
2. Soft legislation + women-friendly welfare states + weak employment protection legislation

Implications



'Soft' quotas work

Policy 'sticks' in the form of 'hard' quotas work, but so can policy 'carrots' in the form of 'soft' quotas *under certain conditions*.



'Soft' quotas can 'offset' any negative effects of 'women-friendly' social policies

Highly-skilled women's access to top jobs need not forever be blocked by generous family policies.



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Thank you for listening!



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